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Illiquidity of Frontier Financial 
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Summary: The paper explores illiquidity of the Serbian financial market for the
period of 2005-2009. The financial market in Serbia is, by its type, a frontier 
market. We used daily data from the BELEXline index, as well as all stocks
within this index in examined timeframe, provided by the Belgrade Stock Ex-
change. Results of this paper suggest that level of market liquidity is low and 
persistent in Serbia. Additionally, results confirm that time-varying illiquidity and 
its volatility is highly unstable in this market. This is the first paper that analyses
liquidity issues in case of Serbia. It identifies different periods and shows that, 
in most cases, ups and downs in foreign investors’ participation leads to dra-
matic falls and rises in market illiquidity and its volatility.
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dard deviation. 
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Apart from old and developed markets, there are the so-called emerging markets. 
These are primarily markets in Asia and Latin America. A new group of markets has 
lately been defined in Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, the so-called 
frontier markets (Dragan Šestović and Mladen Latković 1998). Frontier or pre-
emerging markets are to, in any of the forthcoming evolution phases only, share 
similar levels of liquidity, and similar risk and outputs characteristics with emerging 
markets. Frontier markets are, thus, neither considered to be developed nor emerging. 
Typical examples of frontier markets, among others, are Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. We have focused in this paper on li-
quidity issues on frontier markets and the Serbian stock market in particular. The 
main hypothesis is that level of liquidity is low and persistent on this stock market. 
Another hypothesis is that time-varying illiquidity and its volatility is highly unstable 
in the Serbian market.  
Liquidity of a market is characterized by the ability of investors to buy and 
sell securities easily. Illiquidity occurs when an asset or securities cannot be quickly 
converted into cash (Andrew Clark 2008). Put another way, market liquidity refers to 
the ability to undertake transactions in such a way as to adjust portfolios and risk pro-
files without disturbing underlying prices (Andrew Crockett 2008).  
Undoubtedly, liquidity has an effect on assets value (see papers by Yakov 
Amihud 2002; Luboš Pástor and Robert F. Stambaugh 2003; Viral V. Acharya and 
Lasse Heje Pedersen 2005; Ronnie Sadka 2006; Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey, 
and Christian Lundblad 2007; etc.). This is why it is one the most favorable characte-
ristics required by investors. Liquidity on a stock exchange is generated by so called 
market makers. Speculative investors and market makers are key players that bring 350  Boško Živković and Jelena Minović 
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about market or assets liquidity (Gur Huberman and Dominika Halka 2001). Indeed, 
liquidity is a prerequisite for investors (both individuals and institutions) to get re-
turns from expected changes in prices. They, in turn, generate demands enabling li-
quidity. One of key difficulties any investor might face on a frontier market is a low 
level of market liquidity. While such markets are typically open and available for 
foreign investors, low liquidity often hinders a more serious level of investments by 
institutional investors (see a survey by Punam Chuhan 1994). It is often thought that 
a low level of liquidity is, therefore, one of key issues typical for small frontier mar-
kets.   
Measuring market liquidity is not a trivial issue
1. Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2007) analyze measuring of liquidity for 19 emerging equity markets. 
Clark (2008) studies history and measurement of liquidity risk in frontier markets. 
Many of the more sophisticated measures of (il)liquidity
2 could not be used for esti-
mation of liquidity of the Serbian frontier market, because of the lack of data and 
specific features of this market. Lesmond (2005) concludes that any measuring of 
liquidity has its advantages and disadvantages when used for estimation of liquidity 
among countries or within a country. Models based on the volume such as Amihud’s 
measure and turnover could be misleading in case of weak liquidity markets. This 
shortage is practically manifested in a reduced scope of revenues affecting turnover, 
as well as null returns influencing Amihud’s measuring. Findings by Lesmond 
(2005), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) show that turnover is not a sustainable 
measure of liquidity in emerging markets. It is neither a good measure for estimation 
of liquidity among countries nor within each respective country. Lesmond (2005) 
points out that it is very important to select an appropriate measure of liquidity be-
cause these measures are necessary for adequate estimation of the market efficiency. 
Selection of an appropriate measure of liquidity for frontier capital markets is a key 
issue for empirical analysis. 
We shall in this paper focus on illiquidity of the Serbian financial market for 
the period of October, 2005 – July, 2009. We have used daily data from the BELEX-
line index, as well as daily data for individual stocks within this index. The return of 
the market is the return of the capitalization-weighted index, BELEXline. We have 
chosen the price impact measure of Bekaert et al. (2007) to measure illiquidity. The 
authors applied this illiquidity measure for emerging markets, and it turned out relia-
ble in estimation of illiquidity of these markets. Market return and market illiquidity 
measures in case of Serbia have been separately considered aiming at getting indi-
vidual dynamics over time. We have used univariate Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (by Tim Bollerslev 1986) in order 
to capture time variation of the volatility of illiquidity. This paper identifies different 
periods and shows that, in most cases, ups and downs in foreign investors’ participa-
tion have led to dramatic falls and rises in market illiquidity and its volatility. 
                                                        
1 See papers by Albert S. Kyle (1985), Amihud (2002), Richard Roll (1984), Sanford Jay Grossman and 
Merton H. Miller (1988), David A. Lesmond, Joseph P. Ogden, and Charles A. Trzcinka (1999), Pástor 
and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Tarun Chordia, Roll, and Avanidhar Subrahma-
nyam (2000, 2008), Sadka (2006), Huberman and Halka (2001), and others. 
2 Some of the most common of (il)liquidity measures are the following: Turnover, Bid-Ask spread, Roll’s 
model (1984), Kyle’s measure (1985), LOT’s model (named by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka 1999), 
Amihud’s measure (2002), Pástor-Stambaugh factor (2003), and others. 351  Illiquidity of Frontier Financial Market: Case of Serbia 
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The rest of the paper has been divided into the following sections: Section 1 
exploring phenomenology of emerging and frontier financial markets; Section 2 pre-
senting data and introducing our empirical methodology; Section 3 analyzing main 
results concerning illiquidity and its volatility in the Serbian market and Section 4 – a 
conclusion.   
 
1. Phenomenology of Frontier Financial Market 
 
Most emerging and frontier markets, even those in developed economies, are ineffi-
cient. It quite often reflects in the size of the market, poor trading scope, and quality 
of information. Hence, a low trading rate makes a significant number of securities 
illiquid, which leads to inefficiency. Low trading rate is one of the reasons explaining 
why frontier markets show serious deviations from the market efficiency (Latković 
2001). Liquidity is an important factor of stability and efficiency of the financial 
market (Jennifer Huang and Jiang Wang 2007). Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2008) investigated liquidity and market efficiency. Crockett (2008) analyzed market 
liquidity and financial stability. In frontier markets liquidity is not only low but also 
discontinuous. Several weeks may pass between two subsequent trades. Such a situa-
tion is certainly not common for traded securities in developed capital markets 
(Latković 2001). However, frontier markets have some specific features that cannot 
be found in developed markets. 
Main problems of frontier markets which impact market liquidity are the fol-
lowing: a small number of stocks with significant capitalization, a small number of 
outstanding shares, infrequent and irregular trading, etc. Additionally, there are typi-
cal short time series of past trades, lack of transparency and readily accessible infor-
mation about traded companies, as well as occurrence of the so-called invisible forms 
of risk, among which illiquidity is the most important one. Due to all these factors 
frontier markets suffer from an increased level of systematic risk (Latković and Zo-
ran Barac 1999). 
The Belgrade Stock Exchange was the first re-established stock exchange after 
the World War II in East Europe (1989). Nevertheless, it was an organization without 
rules of the game until early 2002. That very year the market began operating in 
more or less standard manner. Shares issued as a result of insider privatization model 
have been main classes of assets traded on this market. A large portion of the total 
capitalization on the Serbian frontier market is highly illiquid, i.e. many companies 
are listed on the exchange just de-jure rather than de-facto. In addition, only a small 
percentage of the company’s assets is typically floated. While this is characteristic of 
almost all economies in transition, the Serbian market, in comparison with many oth-
er transition markets, may be even more illiquid. 
The Serbian frontier market is a one-way market, having in mind the supply 
and demand. It means that main sellers of shares are individual owners, who have 
obtained shares, often for free, within the mass privatization procedure. Main buyers 
of shares on this market come from the enterprise sector. Their goal is to take over 
companies or acquire substantial stakes in companies. This leads to significant con-
centration of ownership and emptying of this market, in particular. The main reason 
for this phenomenon is the fact that this market essentially does not operate as stocks 
market, but as a takeover market of market companies (Boško Živković et al. 2005). 352  Boško Živković and Jelena Minović 
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Foreign investors showed an active interest in emerging markets before the 
global economic crisis. Lured by promised higher returns, they explored opportuni-
ties in emerging markets as well, with a relatively modest success. Frontier markets 
being small in size and their poor liquidity are the main reasons for arisen interest in 
frontier markets (Chuhan 1994). Slavica Penev and Matija Rojec (2004) discover 
main obstacles to foreign direct investment flows into the South-East Europe region: 
high investment risks, lack of adequate physical infrastructure, delays in bank re-
structuring and rehabilitation, underdeveloped financial markets, delays in large–
scale privatization and enterprise reform, inadequate development level of institu-
tional infrastructure, administrative barriers to foreign direct investment and unfavor-
able legal environment.  
Lack of liquidity was one of main challenges the Belgrade Stock Exchange 
was facing, even during intense periods of trading. In the course of 2008, the first 
step towards boosting liquidity was made by developing and implementing the mar-
ket maker concept. Market makers are expected to facilitate order execution especial-
ly for retail investors. Market making operations, which involve simultaneous and 
continuous placement of buy and sell orders, have significantly increased liquidity of 
stocks (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2009b). 
Market liquidity can also be affected by asymmetric information. For instance, 
when information on company’s successful innovation leading to increased sales and 
profit is accessed by only a small number of investors, they will conduct a massive 
purchase of the associated stock, leading to misbalanced price formation process. 
This will further on stimulate distortion on the market liquidity in general (Erie Fa-
brian and Aldrin Herwany 2008). Deep information asymmetry between the buyer 
and the seller is found on the Serbian frontier market (Živković et al. 2005).  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
We have daily returns for individual stocks within the BELEXline index, trading in 
the Serbian discontinuous market from October, 2005 until July, 2009.
3 Daily returns 
would be estimated (daily returns are calculated as difference in log price at closing) 
for a huge collection of companies from Serbia (over 200 companies). Return of the 
market is a return of capitalization-weighted index, BELEXline, which entails all 
stocks available on a particular day in the sample.  
The Belgrade Stock Exchange has calculated and published index BELEXline 
since 2 April 2007, as a benchmark for monitoring broad market movements
4. The 
BELEXline index is descriptive, in the statistical sense, and not investible (mean of 
return on this index is zero, Table 2 in Appendix). The index weighting is based on 
market capitalization. In addition, only a small percentage of the company’s assets 
are typically floated in Serbia. Change in the level of capitalization is not a repre-
sentative measure of a frontier market’s liquidity. Due to illiquidity of belonging se-
                                                        
3 The Belgrade Stock Exchange. 2009c. Used time series. 
http://www.belex.rs/trgovanje/indeksi/belexline/korpa (accessed July 14, 2009). 
4 The Belgrade Stock Exchange index was created in December 2005 and published under the official 
name BELEXfm. It was decided, due to market related circumstances, that this index should be replaced 
with a new general index BELEXline, which would more precisely describe market tendencies. 353  Illiquidity of Frontier Financial Market: Case of Serbia 
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curities, index composition is often modified, which is why index is not the best 
choice for the market proxy. However, we do not have a better market proxy and 
consequently have to use the BELEXline index. 
We use the price impact (PI) measure suggested by Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad (2007) in order to measure illiquidity. This measure aims at incorporating 
potential price impact by using length of a non-trading (or zero return) interval (Be-
kaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2007). Our price impact illiquidity measure is based on 
the software program within the Microsoft Access package. This program enabled 
specification of a selected illiquidity measure. As a check, we also computed a value-
weighted
5 illiquidity measure of BELEXline index. Sadka (2006), and Acharya and 
Pedersen (2003) suggest that computing the market illiquidity as an equal-weighted 
average is perhaps more appropriate than a value-weighted average since liquid firms 
are over represented in the sample. A value-weighted average would further worsen 
this problem because it would substantially represent the largest of firms in the sam-
ple. 
We have therefore modeled market illiquidity as a stochastic price impact 
process. Series of market returns and market illiquidity measures in the Serbian case 
are separately considered aiming at getting their individual dynamics over time. In 
addition to this, series of buy-sell orders
6 are identified for both individual and insti-
tutional investors (see Figure 3). 
A selected illiquidity measure (PI) value ranges from 0 to 1; with the value 
closer to 1 denoting extremely high market illiquidity. Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad (2007) found that Indonesia is the least liquid country according to the val-
ue of PI measure (mean of PI = 0.776). Taiwan has a mean of PI measure = 0.158, 
implying that Taiwan is the most liquid country of all 19 analyzed emerging markets. 
We have established some critical values aiming at testing our low liquidity level 
hypothesis. PI’s average value for all 19 analyzed emerging markets was 0.552 in 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007). We have then decided to denote all values of 
PI measure above 0.552 as low liquidity. We may see from Table 2 in Appendix that 
the mean of illiquidity measures is 0.605, indicating that the Serbian market is illiqu-
id. Low liquidity level hypothesis of the Serbian market cannot be rejected. We cal-
culated an average value of PI measure in order to compare illiquidity for each re-
spective year (see Table 6 in Appendix). The most illiquid year was 2006 (mean of 
PI = 0.735), while the least illiquid year was 2007 (mean of PI = 0.460). The stan-
dard deviation of illiquidity measures is 0.174 (Table 2 in Appendix). To test insta-
bility of illiquidity and its volatility hypothesis, we have to use ARMA-GARCH 
analysis. The hypothesis will be rejected unless our series adequately meet the 
GARCH process requirements. In other words, if any ARCH effect is left after speci-
fying the GARCH process. 
 
                                                        
5 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) used capitalization-weighted or value-weighted illiquidity meas-
ure, too. Amihud (2002), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2004), Sadka (2006), and 
others used an equal-weighted illiquidity measure. 
6 The Belgrade Stock Exchange. 2009c. Used time series. 
http://www.belex.rs/trgovanje/ucesce_stranaca (accessed July 14, 2009). 354  Boško Živković and Jelena Minović 
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Before we proceed with modeling, we have to make sure that our series of re-
turns for all analyzed companies within the BELEXline index and the illiquidity 
measures of the BELEXline index are stationary. This is done by testing for the pres-
ence of a unit root utilizing Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF). This test’s regres-
sions clearly support the presence of a unit root factor in the log data of the BELEX-
line index. Furthermore, the ADF statistics for the daily log returns (i.e. the first dif-
ferences), and daily illiquidity measures of the BELEXline index, show that both 
series are stationary (see Table 1 in Appendix). Then, our log returns and series of 
illiquidity measures were tested against normal distribution, having used descriptive 
statistics (skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera normality test etc. in Table 2 in Appen-
dix). According to Table 2 it can be seen that the series of log returns on the BELEX-
line index have positive skewness coefficient which means that distribution of log 
returns has a long right tail. The kurtosis coefficient of these log returns exceeds 3, so 
the distribution of this series is peaked (leptokurtic) relative to the normal. On the 
other hand, the series of illiquidity measures on the BELEXline index has negative 
skewness coefficient which means that distribution of market illiquidity has a long 
left tail. The kurtosis coefficient of this illiquidity measure is less than 3, the distribu-
tion of this series is flat (platykurtic) relative to the normal. The value of the Jarque-
Bera normality test is very high and probability is significantly low for both analyzed 
series, so the null hypothesis of a normal distribution should be rejected. Thus, ac-
cording to the results presented in Table 2 in the Appendix, we see that series of 
market returns and series of market illiquidity are not normally distributed. We have 
then applied Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) analysis for the log return 
and illiquidity measures of the BELEXline index in order to obtain a residual series, 
which is free of serial correlation. We specified ARMA models, which minimize 
information criteria. It is known that Schwarz’s criterion (SIC) correctly identifies an 
ARMA model, whereas Akaike’s criterion (AIC) tends to over fit the model. Accord-
ing to SIC criterion, ARMA (1,3) process was chosen for the log returns and AR-
MA(4,2) was chosen for the illiquidity measures of the BELEXline index. It is clear 
from Table 3 that the residuals obtained from ARMA models for both series are not 
normally distributed, because the normality assumption is rejected at the 5% signific-
ance level if JB>5.99. However, even if the distribution of the residuals is not nor-
mal, the estimates are still consistent under quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) as-
sumptions. This method is used in estimation of the parameters in volatility models. 
After specifying a mean equation by testing serial dependence in the data and 
building an ARMA model for the log returns and illiquidity measures of the BELEX-
line index, the residuals of the mean equation were used to test ARCH effects. Also, 
the residuals had to be tested for the absence of autocorrelation (Table 3 in Appen-
dix). Table 3 shows that the Ljung-Box (Q) test is not significant for residuals of both 
series, which means that the residuals behave like a white noise process. Then, the Q-
statistics are significant for squared residuals across all lag lengths for return and illi-
quidity series, and the presence of ARCH effects was inferred in both series. On the 
other hand, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test shows strong ARCH effects for return 
(with F(5.94)=32.77, p<.001) and illiquidity series (with F(5.93)=3.45, p<.01). Then, 
a volatility model was specified provided that ARCH effects were statistically signif-355  Illiquidity of Frontier Financial Market: Case of Serbia 
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icant and performed a joint estimation of the mean and volatility equations (see Table 
4 in Appendix). So, we examined volatility of return series and volatility of illiquidi-
ty series for the BELEXline index (see Table 4 in Appendix). In other words, we es-
timated univariate GARCH models, within program package Eviews, Version 6.0, in 
order to get estimated conditional volatility of the corresponding series of residuals.  
Several combinations of GARCH(p,q) models were tested such as ARCH(2), 
GARCH(2,1), and GARCH(1,2). It is known that GARCH(1,1) is equal to 
  ARCH  . Each model was inconsistent, i.e. GARCH(1,1) model proved the most 
suitable one for log return and illiquidity measure of the BELEXline index. Accord-
ing to findings in Table 4 in the Appendix, it can be concluded that the log returns 
follow the ARMA(1,3)-IGARCH(1,1) model, and the illiquidity measures of the 
BELEXline index follow the ARMA(4,2)-GARCH(1,1) model. The results in Table 
4 for both series show that all GARCH coefficients are statistically significant. The 
sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients is close to one, for the log returns of the 
BELEXline index. This suggests the persistence of ARCH effects in the datasets and, 
hence, implies that current information remains important for forecasts of conditional 
variances at all horizons. This special type of GARCH model is termed as an Inte-
grated GARCH (IGARCH). It means that if the residuals of the log returns follow an 
IGARCH process, then the unconditional variance of the residuals is infinite. The 
fitted models can be checked by using the standardized residuals and its squared 
process. The values of Q-statistics with significantly low p-values (less than 10%) of 
the standardized residual series for the log returns of the BELEXline index imply that 
there is autocorrelation. It suggests that we have less associated liquidity equili-
brium
7. Finally, the Ljung-Box statistics (Table 5 in Appendix) of standardized resi-
duals and those of its squared show that models are adequate for describing the hete-
roscedasticity of the data. The ARCH test was applied on the standardized residuals 
to see if there are any ARCH effects left. Both the F-statistic and the LM-statistic are 
insignificant, suggesting no ARCH effects for both series of log returns and illiquidi-
ty measures of the BELEXline index, up to order 5 or 10 (see Table 5 in Appendix). 
Thus, we conclude that our hypothesis about instability of illiquidity and its volatility 
can not be rejected. 
 
3. Illiquidity Behavior on Serbian Financial Market 
 
We shall focus in this section on some of the main reasons of high illiquidity and its 
volatility. The main purpose of this section is to identify different time periods illi-
quidity rise on the Serbian market. We assume that foreign investors are the main 
cause of high/low illiquidity and its volatility on the Serbian market. Fluctuating be-
havior of foreign investors was thus followed by fluctuations in stock prices of the 
major continuously traded stocks as well as the stock market index (BELEXline). 
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot daily log returns and daily illiquidity measures of 
the BELEXline index. In Figure 3 we plot series of buy-sell orders for individual and 
institutional investors. 
                                                        
7 Grossman and Miller (1988) found that the less the autocorrelation value of stock return, the higher the 
associated liquidity equilibrium. 356  Boško Živković and Jelena Minović 
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Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
Figure 1   The Graph of Daily Capitalization-Weighted log Returns of the BELEXline Index 
 
Comparison of plots of returns with plots of illiquidity proves that market illi-
quidity is significantly less stable than market returns (from Table 2 we see that PI 
has a greater standard deviation than market return, 0.174 vs. 0.005). We have, none-
theless, empirically documented that time-varying illiquidity is highly unstable and 
persistent in the Serbian market.
8 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
 
 
Figure 2   The Graph of Daily Value-Weighted Illiquidity Measures of the BELEXline Index 
 
Since 2004 foreign investors have increasingly participated in trading at the 
Belgrade Stock Exchange, but the upward trend slowed down at the beginning of 
                                                        
8 It should be noted that persistence of liquidity is empirically documented by Amihud (2002), Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Joel Hasbrouck and Duane J. Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka 
(2001), and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and others. 
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2007 (see Figure 3) due to a large inflow of new domestic investors, who pushed the 
participation of foreign investors below the level of 50% (The Belgrade Stock Ex-
change 2007). As it was mentioned before, it is evident in Figure 3 that the Serbian 
market is a one-way market. This means that the main sellers of shares are individual 
owners who have obtained shares, often for free, within the mass privatization proce-
dure. Before we start an elaborate analysis of operations on the Serbian capital mar-
ket, it is very important to notice that the biggest emptying of this market took place 
in May 2007 and October 2008. The emptying mechanism operates in the following 
way: during the period of concentration the trade in given shares gains speed and the 
number of transactions increases up to the point where a sizeable or a controlling 
stake is formed; after that the trade in these shares declines. Since demand is falling, 
the price of the shares is falling as well (Živković et al. 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Belgrade Stock Exchange (2009c). 
 
 
Figure 3   The Graph of Daily Structure of Demand and Supply for Individual and Institutional  
Investors 
 
 
In Figures 4 and 5 we plot the daily conditional standard deviations of log re-
turns and illiquidity measures of the BELEXline index, respectively. 
In addition to visual inspection Figures 4 and 5 prove that conditional standard 
deviations of returns and illiquidity of the market index BELEXline exhibit signifi-
cant changes over time. Therefore, these standard deviations are very unstable over 
time. The market’s illiquidity is more volatile than the logs of market returns. It is 
commonly thought that this instability of illiquidity (Figure 2) and its volatility (Fig-
ure 5) are, therefore, the key problems areas facing small frontier markets.  
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Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
Figure 4   The Conditional Standard Deviation from GARCH Process for log Returns of the BELEX-
line Index on Daily Basis 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
Figure 5   The Conditional Standard Deviation from GARCH Process for Illiquidity Measures of the 
BELEXline Index on Daily Basis 
 
 
Key notions follow: In the last quarter of 2005 (especially on 30 November), a 
slight fall of illiquidity is evident (Figure 2) and its volatility (Figure 5). In this pe-
riod, compared to the regional indices, the BELEXfm index scored the strongest dy-
namics of growth, attracting new, both domestic and foreign investors to the Serbian 
share market (see Figure 3) (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2005). So, the course of 
the year 2005 can be considered the first demand boom on the Serbian equity market. 
Several events contributed to higher demand for shares: a budget surplus in the first 
quarter of 2005, then a number of new, high quality shares was introduced. All these 
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have contributed to the warming up of the investment climate, particularly on behalf 
of foreign institutional investors. Their entry into the Serbian market was an incen-
tive to domestic individual investors to start buying the most attractive shares on the 
continuous market, as well. An increased activity of foreign investment funds led to a 
quick rise in demand. This group was joined by domestic institutional and individual 
investors (see Figure 3). The inflow of demand resulted in higher prices. An impor-
tant event in the evolution of the market was the appearance of small individual in-
vestors who for the first time appeared as relevant buyers of shares on the continuous 
market (Živković et al. 2005). 
In the first quarter of 2006 (January-March), the rise of volatility of illiquidity 
can be identified (Figure 5) as caused by the drop in foreign investors participation 
(see Figure 3). In that period there was a boom on Serbian financial market. General-
ly, in the first and the second quarters of 2006, there was a considerable turnover on 
the stock exchange, which reflected the increase in the value of return of the trade 
index (mid May, in Figure 1) as well as the decrease of market illiquidity (Figure 2). 
By the end of the second quarter (particularly in July 2006) a fall in illiquidity can be 
seen (Figure 2), as well as the increase of market returns (Figure 1). The reason for 
the market growth in that period was that foreign investors participation in trading on 
the Belgrade Stock Exchange was advancing in 2006 (particularly in July, see Figure 
3) in absolute and relative values. During the first and second quarter, foreign inves-
tors kept their participation steady between 50 and 70% with the climb at the begin-
ning of the last quarter (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2006). 
At the end of the third and beginning of the fourth quarter of 2006 (particular-
ly in October), there was a slight fall of illiquidity and its volatility (Figures 2 and 5) 
which can be associated with passing the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 
which slightly influenced the rise of foreign investors participation (Figure 3).  
In the last quarter of 2006, there was a big drop in the foreign investors partic-
ipation (particularly in December 2006, see Figure 3) mainly due to the turnover, to 
which domestic investors contributed. This drop in the foreign investor’s participa-
tion would directly influence a significant increase of illiquidity (Figure 2), as well as 
the increase of the volatility of illiquidity (Figure 5), in the period November-
December 2006. Also, the value of the market return in the last quarter was very low 
(Figure 1).  
In the first quarter of 2007 (especially January, 2007), an extreme fall of illi-
quidity is evident (see Figure 2) as well as its volatility (see Figure 5). The trend 
from the end of 2006 continued and reached its peak in the first months of 2007, 
when the interest in trading at the stock exchange considerably increased (Figure 3). 
The opening of investment and pension funds further boosted the market, which in 
turn attracted an even bigger number of new participants, particularly domestic pro-
fessional and small investors. In the period when the market experienced its histori-
cal peak, small domestic investors increased their participation (these investors in-
deed made decisions on investing in conditions of deep information asymmetry) in 
the turnover 10 times in comparison to the same period in the previous year, and on 
the purchase side their participation accounted for 25% (The Belgrade Stock Ex-
change 2007). The BELEXfm index had growth rate by 15.4% of its last December 360  Boško Živković and Jelena Minović 
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value from 2006 (Figure 1). The turnover practically tripled in this period if com-
pared with the same period in 2006 (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2007). In Figure 
5 an extreme growth of the volatility of illiquidity can be seen in the period Febru-
ary-March 2007. During that period there were political turbulences in Serbia. Due to 
insecurity there was a drop in foreign investor’s participation as it can be seen in 
Figure 3 in this period. 
During the second quarter of 2007 (particularly in May), foreign investors has-
tily withdrew from the Serbian market due to uncertainty, which is accompanied by 
withdrawal of local investors (see peak in emptying the market, Figure 3). This 
“withdrawal” effect is mainly visible with the most liquid stocks and it would affect 
the increase of market illiquidity (Figure 2). On the other hand, there was an increase 
in the volatility of returns (Figure 4) as well as a fall in the volatility of illiquidity 
(Figure 5) on May 2007.  
In the third quarter of 2007 (July-September), the situation at the stock ex-
change was good, and prices rose sharply. In Figure 1 it can be seen that the market 
yield rose, while in Figure 2 it is evident that illiquidity fell significantly (Figure 2) 
as well as its volatility (Figure 5). Practically, in that period the market was liquid. 
Having in mind all that was said before, it can be concluded that a short-term growth 
of the market at that time was not founded in the economy.  
In the last quarter of 2007, a slight increase in foreign investments can be seen 
on the sell side, primarily because of a growing uncertainty, above all due to the po-
litical situation, resulting in a significant fall in the turnover during that period (The 
Belgrade Stock Exchange 2007). That would affect the increase of the market illi-
quidity (Figure 2) and its volatility (Figure 5), especially in November 2007. During 
this period there was a decrease in the value of the market returns (Figure 1), as well 
as the rise in volatility of market return (Figure 4).  
In general, during the course of the year 2007, illiquidity of the Serbian market 
was at the lowest level (mean of PI = 0.460, Table 6 in Appendix) if compared with 
other years given in the sample (Figure 2, and Table 6). In 2007 the number of natu-
ral entities participating in trading significantly increased. The importance of natural 
entities on capital markets is reflected in a large number of low value transactions, 
which contribute to the liquidity of individual securities and consequently to the li-
quidity of the market. In that year, Serbia’s investment inflows reached $5.4 bn, but-
tressing its robust growth in gross domestic product that has averaged 7.3 per cent 
over the past three years
9. The rise in the turnover and the number of transactions in 
2007 was mostly due to the retail investors participating for the first time in such a 
large number on the domestic capital market, as well as to the opening of new in-
vestment and pension funds. According to the data released by the Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of Serbia, direct foreign investments amounted to EUR 
960m since October 2007. A steady increase in foreign investments was recorded at 
the Belgrade Stock Exchange, which in 2007 amounted to RSD 36 billion (The Bel-
grade Stock Exchange 2007). 
 
                                                        
9 Financial Times. 2007. “Where risks are low and profits high.” May 30. 
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In the first quarter of 2008, the market responded in a negative and volatile 
manner (Figure 4) causing the index to drop by 25.86% during the first quarter, los-
ing 17.72% in March alone (Figure 1), the biggest monthly drop ever recorded (The 
Belgrade Stock Exchange 2008). In this period (February-March) there was an in-
crease of illiquidity (Figure 2) and its volatility (Figure 5). On the other hand, during 
that period market emptying effect was evident as well (see Figure 3). However, in-
creased uncertainty on the market discouraged foreign institutional investors and they 
withdrew which resulted in the withdrawal of domestic individual investors.  
The second quarter of 2008, brought certain stabilization and positive result of 
3.75% for the BELEXline, and historical daily high recorded on May 12 (Figure 1), 
which would reflect in sharp fall of illiquidity (Figure 2) and its volatility (Figure 5). 
In May 2008, the largest number of transactions was recorded and amounted to 
12,314. On the other hand, in May 2008 as it can be seen in Figure 4 the volatility of 
market returns reached its peak. This can be associated with the appearance of excess 
returns which are not justified by information gathered on the market. As there is a 
certain information asymmetry on the Serbian frontier market, so in that period do-
mestic individual investors were involved in demand side (Figure 3). That leads to 
the significant concentration of ownership (Figure 3). The highest turnover was rec-
orded in June 2008, amounting to EUR 12.4 million, i.e. just above one billion RSD 
(The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2008). That would cause a drop of illiquidity (Figure 
2) and its volatility (Figure 5) in that period.  
In the third quarter of 2008 (particularly in August), there was a sudden 
growth of the illiquidity of the Serbian market (see Figure 2). The total number of 
transactions in August  was the lowest observed (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 
2008). 
In the last quarter of 2008, worsening of the global financial crisis reflected on 
the domestic market in a reduced interest in trading, particularly in the second half of 
2008 when the turnover and transactions was substantially lower. Consequently, rela-
tive participation of foreign investors on the sell side rose, falling on the buy side and 
generating a strong negative signal of the withdrawal of foreign investors from the 
market (see Figure 3 the last big peak downwards in October 2008), which only ag-
gravated the already negative effects of the global crisis (The Belgrade Stock Ex-
change 2008). Domestic individual investors who were dominant by then withdrew 
from the market and sold shares acquired in privatization (emptying of Serbian mar-
ket on Figure 3). The lowest monthly turnover in the last three years in the amount of 
5 billion RSD was realized in November (sudden growth of illiquidity, Figure 2). In 
Figure 4, volatility of market return was evident in October-November 2008. How-
ever, the movement of the BELEXline index in the second half of 2008 was greatly 
affected by the events on the global financial market (the third big peak in Figure 1). 
On December 22, 2008 there was a growth of market illiquidity (Figure 2) and its 
volatility (Figure 5), as well as the decline of market returns in Figure 1, what is also 
recorded as the annual minimum. So, in the conditions of global financial crisis, Ser-
bia experienced a decline in domestic demand through a decline in public and private 
spending caused by a fall in earnings and credit availability. According to the data of 
the Ministry of Finance, direct foreign investments in 2008 were somewhat higher 362  Boško Živković and Jelena Minović 
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than in the previous year, but the level of EUR 1.7b was half the level of the record-
holding 2006. The worsening of liquidation and more expensive borrowing led to a 
slowdown of the financial sector, while the growing insecurity of the general popula-
tion resulted in the reduction of bank savings. A growth in illiquidity (Figure 2) is 
also reflected in the total number of realized transactions, which reached the lowest 
level since the introduction of electronic trading at the Belgrade Stock Exchange 
(The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2008).  
Generally speaking, in 2008 there was great volatility of both market returns 
and market illiquidity (Figures 4 and 5). These observations are in accordance with 
the real activities on the market: the world financial crises, a fall in economic activity 
by foreign investors, the state intervention in the private sector, tightening of regula-
tion and political instability in Serbia, degradation of the investment rating of the 
country, frequent oscillations of the exchange rate of the local currency, delays of 
public companies’ privatization through IPOs. In 2008, the total turnover decrease by 
56.4%, and there was decrease in the total number of transactions by 60% (The Bel-
grade Stock Exchange 2009a).  
In the first quarter of 2009, the movement of the BELEXline index started in a 
volatile manner (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2009a), see Figure 4. The beginning 
of the year 2009 brought about extremely low turnover in securities at the stock ex-
change. Participation of the foreign investors in the total value of turnover is reduced 
in this period (Figure 3). Having in mind extremely low value of the total turnover in 
January 2009 which amounted to 1.4 million RSD, it is easy to notice that values of 
the turnover of the foreign investors are far less than the usual ones, reflecting the 
potentially new trend in fluctuation of these indicators, due to the activities on the 
global market (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2009a). In January-February 2009, as 
it can be seen in Figures 2 and 5, the growth of market illiquidity and its volatility, 
respectively, is evident. This period represents the peak of the crises in the Serbian 
market.  
In the second quarter of 2009 (particularly in April and May), foreign inves-
tors were more active as the buyers of the shares and not the sellers. It is a positive 
step forward, having in mind that from December 2008 till April 2009 foreign inves-
tors were more agile on the sell side (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2009b). Signifi-
cant growth in foreign investor’s participation affects drop in market illiquidity (Fig-
ure 2) and its volatility (Figure 5) in this period. In May 2009, the BELEXline noted 
growth by 26.38% (see Figure 1). Also, the number of transactions in May almost 
doubled in comparison with that in April (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2009b). On 
the other hand, a growth in volatility of market return is evident in May 2009. Reoc-
currence of drop in market illiquidity (Figure 2) and its volatility (Figure 5) can be 
seen in June 2009. The reason can be found in the fact that in June 2009 three more 
securities got market makers
10. Market operations, which involve simultaneous and 
                                                        
10 On June 15, 2009, Sinteza Invest Group a.d. Belgrade has conducted market making operations for 
shares of the issuer Veterinarski zavod a.d. Subotica. M&V Investments a.d. Novi Sad operates as a mar-
ket maker for shares of the issuer Metalac a.d. Gornji Milanovac from June 22, 2009. The third market 
maker in June 2009 – Synergy Capital a.d. Belgrade signed the contract and will start to make market for 
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continuous placement of buy and sell orders, significantly increase the liquidity of 
those shares (The Belgrade Stock Exchange 2009b). That would reflect the increase 
of market returns (Figure 1) thus reducing volatility of market returns (Figure 4). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper explored illiquidity of the Serbian frontier financial market in the period: 
October 2005-July 2009. This is the first paper that has analyzed liquidity issues in 
the case of Serbia. As the measure of illiquidity we used the price impact measure 
suggested by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007). Our results suggest that the lev-
el of market liquidity is low and persistent. It is commonly thought that a low level of 
liquidity is, therefore, one of the key problem areas facing small frontier markets. 
The results confirm that time-varying illiquidity and its volatility are very unstable in 
this market. The paper elaborates causes of extremely high market illiquidity and its 
volatility as well as growth/fall of returns in the observed period. In most cases, the 
cause of the dramatic falls and rises in market illiquidity and its volatility is the 
growth and fall in the foreign investor’s participation. This group of investors has 
brought/taken liquidity to/from the Serbian market.  
Future research should examine the impact of illiquidity and liquidity risk in 
explaining price formation in the Serbian market, as a frontier market. We wish to 
investigate whether investors are compensated for holding frontier-markets’ assets 
whose returns are sensitive to liquidity risk. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1   The Results of Testing a Unit Root for Daily log Data, Daily log Returns as well as Daily 
Illiquidity Measures of the BELEXline Index, Respectively. The Null Hypothesis H0: Unit 
Root Exists in the Process; the Alternative Hypothesis: The Process is Stationary 
 
Series  ADF Test level Critical Value H0
pM,t -0.62 5% -3.41  accepted 
RM,t -19.59 5%  -3.41  rejected 
PIM,t -5.03  5% -3.41  rejected 
 
Notes: pM,t = logBELEXline; RM,t = dlog(BELEXline); PIM,t = PI_BELEXline. 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
Table 2   Descriptive Statistics for Daily log Data, then for Daily log Returns, as well as for Daily  
Illiquidity Measures of the BELEXline Index, Respectively 
 
Series  Mean Max  Min  S.D.  S  K  JB  Prob Obs 
pM,t 3.375  3.700  2.925  0.206  -0.409  2.340  43.725  0.000  949 
RM,t  -0.000 0.043 -0.030 0.005  0.366   14.140 4922.935 0.000  948 
PIM,t   0.605  0.934  0.138   0.174  -0.222  2.265   29.136   0.000  947 
 
Notes: pM,t = logBELEXline; RM,t = dlog(BELEXline); PIM,t = PI_BELEXline; S.D.= Standrad Deviation; S=the coefficient of skewness; K=the 
coefficient of kurtosis; JB= the Jarque-Bera test. 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
Table 3   The Ljung-Box Statistics of Residuals and Squared Residuals of log Returns and of Illiquidi-
ty Measures in ARMA Models and Test for ARCH Effect, as well as the Jarque-Bera (JB) 
Normality Test of Residuals Obtaind from ARMA Models 
 
The Ljung-Box Statistics  ARCH-LM(5) test  The JB Test 
series Q(10) Q(35) Q
2(10) Q
2(35) F-stat Obs*R^2  JB 
RM,t  5.907 
(0.434) 
41.354 
(0.101) 
252.62 
(0.000) 
281.22 
(0.000) 
32.774 
(0.000) 
140.349 
(0.000) 
6772.002 
(0.000) 
PIM,t  6.3274 
(0.787) 
33.642 
(0.534) 
26.359 
(0.003) 
57.245 
(0.010) 
3.4523 
(0.0043) 
17.0569 
(0.0044) 
10.838 
(0.004) 
 
Notes: RM,t = dlog(BELEXline); PIM,t = PI_BELEXline. The number in parentheses denotes p-value. 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
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Table 4   A Joint Estimation of the Mean and Volatility Equations for Series of BELEXline Returns 
and BELEXline Illiquidity 
 
BELEXline log  return  PI  measure 
Mean Equation 
  Coeff. S.E.  z-Stat Prob. Coeff. S.E.  z-Stat Prob. 
C  0.001 0.000  1.101 0.271 0.642 0.059 10.803 0.000 
AR(1)  0.982 0.011  92.445 0.000 0.252 0.051  4.993  0.000 
AR(2)  -  - - -  1.070 0.045 23.719 0.000 
AR(3)  -  - - -  -0.252 0.048  -5.234  0.000 
AR(4)  -  - - -  -0.087 0.043  -2.016  0.044 
MA(1)  -0.686 0.035 -19.432 0.000 0.154 0.037  4.213  0.000 
MA(2)  -0.021 0.043  -0.488 0.626 -0.840 0.037 -23.018 0.000 
MA(3)  -0.186 0.035  -5.375 0.000  -  - - - 
Variance Equation 
C  0.000 0.000  5.898 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.878  0.380 
ARCH(1)  0.317 0.076  4.180 0.000 0.034 0.016  2.161  0.031 
GARCH(1)  0.703 0.043  16.395 0.000 0.934 0.041 22.851 0.000 
S.E. of reg.  0.005  0.101 
Sum sq. res.  0.021  9.581 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
Table 5   The Ljung-Box Statistics of Standardized Residuals and Squared Standardized Residuals 
of log Returns and of Illiquidity Measures from GARCH Models and ARCH-LM Test of  
Order 5 and 10 
 
The Ljung-Box statistics  ARCH-LM(5)  ARCH-LM(10) 
series Q(36)  Q
2(36) F-stat Obs*R^2 F-stat Obs*R^2 
RM,t  57.566  
(0.013) 
44.320  
(0.161) 
0.763  
(0.576) 
3.826  
(0.575) 
0.593 
(0.821) 
5.957 
 (0.819) 
PIM,t  34.328 
 (0.548) 
18.248 
 (0.994) 
0.900 
(0.481) 
4.505 
 (0.479) 
0.539 
 (0.863) 
5.423 
 (0.861) 
 
Notes: RM,t = dlog(BELEXline); PIM,t = PI_BELEXline. The number in parentheses denotes p-value. 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
Table 6   An Average Value of Daily Illiquidity Measure of BELEXline Index for Every Year in  
Observed Period 
 
average  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
PIM,t  0.552 0.735 0.460 0.590 0.689 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 